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INTRODUCTION
Four decades ago in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,' the Supreme Court
struck down a racial gerrymander enacted by the Alabama legislature
after African-American citizens in Tuskegee sought to participate in
the city's political affairs.2 The legislation redrew Tuskegee's bounda-
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. Yale 1991; J.D. Yale
1994. Thanks to Heather Gerken, Daniel Halberstam, Rick Hills, Don Herzog, Deborah
Malamud, Nina Mendelson, Ronald Mann, and Rick Pildes for helpful discussions and
comments, and to Benjamin Mizer and Emily Morris for research assistance. Thanks also to
the University of Michigan Law School, which provided generous financial support for this
project through the Cook Endowment.
1. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
2. For more detailed descriptions of the events in Tuskegee, see generally MARGARET
EDDS, FREE AT LAST: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED WHEN CIVIL RIGHTS CAME TO
SOUTHERN POLITICS (1987); ROBERT J. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE (1985); BERNARD TAPER, GOMILLION V. LIGHTFOOT:
THE TUSKEGEE GERRYMANDER CASE (1962).
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ries "from a square to an uncouth... strangely irregular twenty-eight
sided figure," that removed virtually every African-American resident
from the city without removing a single white voter.3 Justice Frank-
furter's decision for the Court explained that the legislation was
"solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fenc-
ing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-
existing municipal vote."'4 Such action, he concluded, denied the for-
mer African-American residents of Tuskegee the right to vote on ac-
count of their race in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.'
Last Term, the Supreme Court relied on Gomillion to hold that
Hawaii, like Alabama before it, had segregated voters by race in viola-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment. The state law at issue in Rice v.
Cayetano6 provided that only "Hawaiians" could vote for the trustees
of the state's Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), a public agency
that oversees programs designed to benefit the State's native people.7
Rice holds that restricting the OHA electorate to descendants of the
1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands embodied a racial classifica-
tion that effectively "fenc[ed] out whole classes of ... citizens from de-
cisionmaking in critical state affairs."8
In one sense, the majority's equation of the OHA's voting restric-
tion with Tuskegee's racial gerrymander comes as no surprise. To be
sure, the Hawaiian scheme differed on its facts from the Alabama law
at issue in Gomillion. Instead of an empowered, white majority
"singl[ing] out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for spe-
cial discriminatory treatment,"9 and "depriv[ing] them of their pre-
existing.., vote,"'" the non-native Hawaiian majority, through the
3. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340,341.
4. Id. at 341.
5. See id. at 347-48.
6. 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
7. The state laws at issue distinguish among Hawaiians, who include any descendant of a
person living on the Hawaiian Islands in 1778; Native Hawaiians, who include any descen-
dant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
previous to 1778; and implicitly all other citizens of Hawaii. See, e.g., HAW. CONST., art. XII,
§ 5; Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1047, 1055. In an effort to minimize confusion, this Article uses the
terms "native," "aboriginal," and "indigenous" people to refer to those included within the
OHA's electorate.
8. 120 S. Ct. at 1059.
9. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
10. Id. at 341. On the role of traditional and preexisting practices, see, e.g., Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952 (1996) (discussing the importance of traditional districting principles); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 647 (1996) (noting the "absence of precedent" for a state amend-
ment invalidating local laws that barred discrimination against homosexuals); Gomillion, 364
U.S. at 341-42 (noting the contrast between old and new boundaries of Tuskegee); see also
Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 HOuS. L. REV.
289 (1997).
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adoption of a new state constitution, voluntarily opted to fence itself
out of the electorate for a new state agency expressly created to bene-
fit a historically disempowered minority population.11 Yet, to a Court
increasingly convinced that racial classifications never exist benignly,"
Hawaii's ostensible absence of invidious intent simply did not pertain.
Once the Court in Rice concluded that Hawaii had defined the OHA's
electorate in racial terms, the Justices viewed Hawaii's motives for
doing so as irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. In this regard, Rice
simply imports into Fifteenth Amendment review the rigorous scru-
tiny currently applied to seemingly well-intentioned race-based classi-
fications under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 While this holding may
be nominally novel, the Court's decision to adopt this approach might
easily have been predicted.
Quite startling and worthy of attention, however, is the path the
Court took in reaching its holding. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
in Rice accepts, at least for argument's sake, 4 Hawaii's claims that (1)
the native people who compose the OHA's electorate hold a position
similar to Native American Indian tribes, (2) the OHA itself resem-
bles a special-purpose district and not a general governmental body,
and (3) the OHA's electorate held a distinct property interest in OHA
affairs. 5 Hawaii maintained that these factors removed the case from
the ambit of the Fifteenth Amendment: the first factor established that
the OHA's voting scheme employed a nonsuspect, political classifica-
tion as opposed to a highly suspect or forbidden racial one; the second
factor indicated that the OHA elections themselves did not implicate a
constitutionally protected right to vote; and the third factor meant that
11. Justice Stevens's dissent in Rice makes this point when he argues that Hawaii acted
without invidious intent. See Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1063 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is
simply no invidious discrimination present in this effort to see that indigenous peoples are
compensated for past wrongs, and to preserve a distinct and vibrant culture that is as much a
part of the Nation's heritage as any.").
The Court, moreover, was unmoved by the fact that a democratically accountable body
implemented the voting restriction. See id.; see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Ball v. James,
451 U.S. 355,373 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
12. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905-08 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
13. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenge to a minority set-aside program). The Court has previously applied the Four-
teenth Amendment's intent requirement to claims brought under the Fifteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1980) (applying the framework from Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
272 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 266
(1977)).
14. See infra notes 55, 92, 111 and accompanying text.
15. 120 S. Ct. at 1058-61.
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the voting scheme involved neither race nor the right to vote at all. 16
On a conventional understanding of the jurisprudence in this area,
Hawaii should have prevailed in light of the Court's acceptance of
these premises. Without both a racial classification and a selection
process involving the right to vote, the State argued, the OHA's elec-
toral regime could not violate the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Court instead consciously refused to reject these three prem-
ises, but nevertheless insisted that these factors did not save the OHA
voting regime from invalidation under the Fifteenth Amendment. 7
Rice holds that even if native Hawaiians resemble a Native American
Indian tribe and thus qualify as a nonracial and therefore nonsuspect
group for various purposes, they evolve into a highly suspect, indeed
"forbidden," racial group when they compose the exclusive electorate
for public officials serving on a public agency."8 Similarly, Rice holds
that even if the powers of the OHA were sufficiently circumscribed
such that it would otherwise constitute a special-purpose district, the
use of a racial classification to define its electorate transforms the pro-
cess of selecting its officials from a simple administrative act subject to
the most deferential review into one implicating the constitutionally
protected right to vote. 9 Finally, Rice indicates that while the OHA
electorate's common property interest might otherwise have legiti-
mized the voting restriction, the coexistence of a racial classification
with that interest fatally corrupts any legitimate basis for the voting
regime.2" In other words, Rice indicates that the use of a racial classifi-
cation in an electoral process transforms that process into one involv-
ing the constitutionally protected right to vote, even if that process
would not otherwise implicate such a right, and corrupts otherwise le-
gitimate grounds for limiting the franchise. So too, where the process
implicates the right to vote, a previously nonsuspect classification
metamorphoses into one now deemed to be racial.
16. See Brief for Respondent at 13-16, Rice (No. 98-818). These same arguments, Hawaii
contended, meant that the electoral regime also comported with Fourteenth Amendment
requirements. See id.
17. The Court could have rejected outright each factor's applicability to the OHA. As
petitioner argued and the concurring justices found, see Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1060-62 (Breyer,
J., concurring); Brief for Petitioner at 11, Rice (No. 98-818), the Court could have distin-
guished native Hawaiians from Native American Indian tribes and thus have held the former
not entitled to the benefits that flow from the latter's "unique" political status. See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547-48 (1974) (discussing the "unique" status of Indian tribes). So
too, the Court might have held that the OHA's powers did not qualify the agency as a "spe-
cial-purpose" district such that elections for it would not implicate a constitutionally pro-
tected right to vote. Finally, the Court could have held that the State had not defined the
electorate based on property interests because of the absence of full alignment between
members of the OHA's electorate and OHA trust beneficiaries. See Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1060.
18. 120 S. Ct. at 1058-59; see also infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. 120 S. Ct. at 1060; see also infra Part II.C.
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This Article traces the Court's reasoning, which appears puzzling
on its face, to a deeper understanding of racial classifications, partici-
pation in the electoral process, and the relationship between the two.
Rice suggests that the primary value of political participation through
voting lies not in the policies implemented by those elected, but in two
distinct and related intrinsic benefits the vote produces: namely, the
constitutive benefit an individual derives from political engagement
with others and the expressive benefit derived from full membership
in the political community.21 Rice posits, on the one hand, that a juris-
diction's use of race to define an electorate distorts these beneficial ef-
fects by imposing on voters a state-approved identity instead of leav-
ing voters free to develop an identity on their own and by
disseminating the message that racial identity represents a relevant cri-
terion for entry into the political community. Rice presumes, on the
other hand, that the constitutive and expressive aspects of voting pro-
vide a crucial element to a group identity that would otherwise not be
viewed as "racial." This view of race confirms the idea that, at least
within our constitutional practice, the concept of racial identity is a
complex legal conclusion, not a pre-legal fact.
This conception of voting and the impact of race also has signifi-
cant ramifications for future voting rights cases. At a minimum, it sug-
gests that race-based districting plans actionable under Shaw v. Reno2
and its progeny may also produce the distinct injury recognized in
Rice. After Rice, the Court may view the predominance of race in dis-
tricting as not only causing an expressive harm that violates the Equal
Protection Clause, but also as distorting the intrinsic values that the
Fifteenth Amendment protects. So understood, claims brought under
Shaw and Rice may capture the same conduct, but conceive of the in-
jury in somewhat different terms.23 Rice accordingly reinforces Shaw
within the legal landscape, solidifying its approach and demonstrating
how deeply the Court's discomfort with race-based electoral rules has
been woven into doctrinal analysis.
Read more broadly, Rice implies that many applications of section
2 of the Voting Rights Act24 are unconstitutional. Under this reading,
Rice works a dramatic change in voting rights jurisprudence by indi-
cating that electoral rules that even partially rely on race undermine
the intrinsic values of voting and thereby violate the Fifteenth
Amendment. In other words, districting plans not even subject to strict
scrutiny under Shaw might be struck down under Rice. We can
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, § 2 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
25. See infra Part III.B.
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squarely confront these potentially far-reaching consequences of Rice,
this Article suggests, only by recognizing the deeper conceptions of
race and voting that underlie the case.
This Article begins in Part I by discussing the factual background
that gave rise to the conflict in Rice v. Cayetano. Part II then addresses
the Court's decision in Rice, emphasizing the puzzling doctrinal route
the majority took to reach its conclusion that the OHA's voting system
violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Part III explores why the Court
might have chosen this path and suggests that the decision reflects the
views that (1) the Constitution protects the vote primarily because of
its intrinsic value to the individual and (2) the concept of race is a
complex legal conclusion, not a pre-legal fact. It also explores the im-
plications this conception may have in future cases brought under both
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and Shaw v. Reno. This Article
concludes by discussing Rice's distinct understanding of voting's con-
stitutive benefit and by assessing Rice's reliance on Gomillion in light
of the decision's conception of voting's intrinsic values.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The OHA's Electorate
The voting restriction struck down in Rice v. Cayetano constituted
the latest manifestation of the century-old effort to address the condi-
tion of Hawaii's aboriginal peoples. In 1898, following the U.S.-led
overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy,26 a congressional joint resolu-
tion annexed Hawaii and provided that nearly two million acres of
public land deemed ceded to the U.S. would be "used solely for the
benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and
other public purposes."27 Two years later, the Hawaii Organic Act
26. For nearly a century prior to the overthrow, U.S. commercial interests had gained
increasing influence over the Hawaiian economy and political affairs. When, in the early
1890s, Queen Liliuokalani began to reassert Native Hawaiian control over governmental
operations, these U.S. interests orchestrated her overthrow, with the aid of the U.S. minister
to Hawaii, who provided military support. President Cleveland refused to recognize the re-
sulting provisional government, but five years later, President McKinley signed the congres-
sional joint resolution annexing the islands. See Message of the President to the Senate and
House of Representatives, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 53-243, at 19-31 (1893). For a more
detailed description of these events, see Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993); Presi-
dent's Annual Message, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 55-16, at 3-13 (1898); LAWRENCE H.
FUCHS, HAWAII PONO: A SOCIAL HISTORY (1961); 3 RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE
HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 582-650 (1967); RUTH TABRAH, HAWAII, A HISTORY (1984). See
also MICHAEL H. HUNT, IDEOLOGY & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 80-91 (1987).
For an assessment of the absence of discussion on the constitutional issues raised by U.S.
expansion, see Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded to Include the Insular
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000).
27. Act of July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 661 and repealed in 1959
upon Hawaii's admission to the Union); Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, § 91, 31 Stat. 141,
159 (1900).
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gave the newly established territorial government control over these
lands. 8 In 1920, concern about the deteriorating condition of Hawaii's
native people led Congress to enact the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act ("HHCA"), which designated 200,000 acres for homesteading by
Native Hawaiians.29 The HHCA defined a "Native Hawaiian" as "any
descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races in-
habiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778." 30
Pursuant to congressional command, the HHCA became part of
Hawaii's constitution when Hawaii became a State in 1959. The State
thereafter assumed trust responsibility for administering HHCA lands
and an additional 1.2 million acres Congress acquired at annexation.
Congress instructed Hawaii to administer these lands, known as the
"Section 5(f) lands," for, inter alia, "the betterment of the conditions
of native Hawaiians."
31
Hawaii adopted a new constitution in 1978 in which it created the
OHA "to address the needs of the aboriginal class of people of Ha-
waii,"32 and to "provide Hawaiians the right to determine the priorities
which will effectuate the betterment of their condition and welfare
and promote the protection and preservation of the Hawaiian race."33
The State also intended the OHA to "unite Hawaiians as a people."34
The OHA's responsibilities include the administration of two public
trusts: the first is comprised of twenty percent of the proceeds from
the Section 5(f) lands that must be used "for the betterment of the
conditions of native Hawaiians;"35 and the second consists of money
appropriated by the state legislature and administered for the benefit
of Hawaiians.36 The OHA also administers federal funds made avail-
able for Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians.37 The Hawaiian Constitu-
tion provides that the OHA shall be managed by a board of trustees,
all of whom "shall be Hawaiians," and that these trustees shall be
28. Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, § 91,31 Stat. 141, 159 (1900).
29. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 108. See also H.R. REP. NO.
66-839, at 4 (1920) (noting that Hawaiian people have been "frozen out of their lands and
driven into the cities," and that "Hawaiian people are dying").
30. HHCA, § 201(a)(7), 42 Stat. 108 (1921).
31. Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3,73 Stat. 4, §§ 4, 5(f) (1959).
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-1(a) (1993).
33. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REP. NO. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 1018 (1980).
34. Id.
35. HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-13.5 (1993). A separate agency administers the 200,000 acres
set aside by the HHCA. See id. § 26-17.
36. See HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
37. See id. § 5.
December 2000]
Michigan Law Review
"elected by qualified voters who are Hawaiians, as provided by law."38
Hawaii defines a Native Hawaiian the same way as the HHCA does,
and defines Hawaiian as "any descendant of the aboriginal peoples in-
habiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and sub-
sisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter
have continued to reside in Hawaii."39 The constitutional restriction of
board membership to Hawaiians reflects the view "that people to
whom assets belong should have control over them" and that "a board
of trustees chosen from among those who are interested parties would
be the best way to insure proper management and adherence to the
needed fiduciary principles."' The constitution likewise limits OHA's
electorate to Hawaiians because it was thought that they "would best
protect their own rights."'" The electoral restrictions, in keeping with
the OHA's overall mission, would allow "a great and proud people...
the opportunity.., to... have more impact on their future."4"
B. The Dispute
In March of 1996, Harold F. Rice attempted to register to vote in
the OHA elections. The registration form asks applicants to declare "I
am also Hawaiian and desire to register to vote in OHA elections."
Rice's ancestors, however, came to the Hawaiian islands in the mid-
nineteenth century, and thus he qualifies neither as a Native Hawaiian
nor as a Hawaiian under the applicable OHA definitions. Rice deleted
the phrase "am also Hawaiian and" and then marked "yes" on the
form. The State rejected his application, prompting Rice to file suit in
38. Id.; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 13D-3(b) (1993) ("No person shall be eligible to
register as a voter for the election of board members unless the person meets the following
qualifications: (1) The person is Hawaiian.").
Rice did not address the constitutional validity of the restriction requiring that OHA
trustees be "Hawaiians," and thus that question remains open. The Fifteenth Amendment,
as originally proposed, provided that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote and
hold office shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or any State, on account of
race ... " CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 379 (1869); see also WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE 55 (1969); XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND
NORTHERN REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910, at 43-44 (1997). While the deletion of the office-
holding phrase might suggest that the Fifteenth Amendment does not prohibit race-based
officeholding requirements, such requirements may still contravene the expressive and con-
stitutive benefits that the Court in Rice suggests underlie the Amendment, see infra Part III,
and may, moreover, independently fail to survive scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
39. HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (1993). The definition of Hawaiian thus includes "Native
Hawaiian" and accords with the more contemporary federal government policy to extend
benefits to all Hawaiians regardless of blood quantum.
40. STANDING COMM. REP. NO. 59 (1978), reprinted in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 644 (1980).
41. Id. at 645.
42. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REP. NO. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 1018 (1980).
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federal court on the grounds that the State had denied him his consti-
tutionally protected right to vote on the basis of race in violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.43
The State of Hawaii defended its voting scheme by arguing that the
OHA's electoral restriction did not involve race or the constitutionally
protected right to vote at all. The State's argument rested on three
contentions. First, it claimed that members of the OHA's electorate
occupy a position similar to that occupied by members of Native
American Indian tribes, and thus are classified according to a common
legal status instead of shared racial characteristics. Second, the State
insisted that the OHA's limited powers render it a "special-purpose
district," to which the heightened constitutional protections governing
the right to vote do not apply. Third, the State maintained that mem-
bers of the OHA's constituency share a common property interest,
given their status as beneficiaries of OHA-administered trusts, and
that this shared interest makes the agency's electoral restriction non-
racial in nature.' Although the lower federal courts substantially
agreed and threw out Rice's claims,45 the Supreme Court reversed.
II. THE RIDDLE OF RICE
In a seven to two decision that rested solely on the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court struck down the OHA's voting re-
43. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (D. Haw. 1997). Rice also challenged
his exclusion from voting in a special election relating to native Hawaiian sovereignty held in
August of 1996. The district court rejected that challenge. See Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. Supp.
1529 (D. Haw. 1996).
44. See Brief for Respondent at 16-50, Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000) (No. 98-
818).
45. The district court held that Hawaii did not base the OHA's electoral restriction on
race and rested it instead on the "unique" guardian-ward relationship that exists between
Hawaii's indigenous people and the State of Hawaii. The court further found that the right
to vote was not implicated because the OHA's limited power rendered it akin to a special-
purpose district. Applying the deferential review accorded to such districts, the district court
held that the voting restriction rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose,
finding that it furthered the State's obligation under federal law to act for the betterment of
its native peoples. See Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1554.
Unlike the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Rice
that the voting restriction constituted a facial race-based classification, but it nevertheless
affirmed the district court's judgment. See Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir.
1998). Noting that Rice challenged the voting restriction, and not the OHA's underlying
administrative structure, the court held that limiting the vote to those for whose benefit the
OHA-administered its trusts "does not deny non-Hawaiians the right to vote in any mean-
ingful sense." Id. Mr. Rice, the court concluded, simply had no interest in the outcome of the
OHA elections and consequently had not been denied the right to vote as protected by the
Fifteenth Amendment. The appellate court further held that the voting restriction passed
muster under the Fourteenth Amendment, even under the strictest scrutiny, in light of the
special trust relationship that existed between Hawaii and the descendants of the islands'
aboriginal peoples. See id. at 1082 (citing STANDING COMM. REP. NO. 59 (1978), reprinted in
1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 64 (1980)).
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striction. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court assumed, arguendo,
that Hawaii correctly asserted that the members of OHA's electorate
resembled members of Indian tribes, that the OHA could constitute a
special-purpose district, and that the agency's constituency could be
understood to hold a distinct property interest as beneficiaries of
OHA-administered trusts. 46 As this Part shows, however, the opinion
appears to ignore the doctrinal consequences that would ordinarily
follow from each point, by holding that the OHA's electoral restric-
tion denied Rice the right to vote based on race.
A. Race as Malleable: The OHA Electorate as Indians
In Morton v. Mancari,47 the Supreme Court upheld a preference in
hiring and promoting at the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") that fa-
vored those who were "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood
and... member[s] of a Federally-recognized tribe."4 The Court con-
cluded that the preference was "political rather than racial in nature"49
because it applied "to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but,
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and
activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion."'5 Based on
this conclusion, Mancari applied a deferential standard of review to
the employment preference and held that it was "rationally designed
to further Indian self-government."51 In Rice, Hawaii argued its in-
digenous peoples held a position similar to that of Indian tribes, and
thus that the Court should apply Mancari's standard of review to the
OHA's voting restriction. The restriction, the State claimed, relied not
on race and instead reflected the special political and legal status of its
native population.52
46. To be sure, the Court expressed considerable skepticism about the validity of each
point, but ultimately accepted each for purposes of its analysis. See infra notes 55, 92, 111
and accompanying text.
47. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
48. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1058 (alteration in original).
49. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 555.
52. See Brief for Respondent at 20-38, Rice (No. 98-818). Hawaii's argument rests on the
notion that the state's aboriginal peoples resemble Indian tribes in certain respects: they
share a similar history of displacement and discrimination. Numerous federal statutes in-
clude Native Hawaiians in statutes designed for the benefit of Indians, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
637(a) (1994); National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470(x) (1994); National
Museum of the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q(1)-(15) (1994); 20 U.S.C. § 1106(b)
(1994); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013
(1994); Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906x; 38 U.S.C. §§ 3761-3764
(1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 11701(2) & (19) (1994) (extending to Native Hawaiians "the same rights
and privileges accorded to American Indian, Alaska Native, Eskimo, and Aleut communi-
ties"); Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991-92 (1994); American In-
dian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994); Indian Health Care Amend-
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The Supreme Court in Rice expressed skepticism as to whether
Congress may treat native Hawaiians as it treats Indian tribes and
whether it may delegate to Hawaii the authority to act in accordance
with that status. 3 The concurring justices rejected the analogy out-
right, 4 but the Rice majority opted ultimately to take no position on
the question, concluding that even if the analogy was sound, it would
not save "a voting scheme of this sort."55 While acknowledging that
Congress may permissibly adopt legislation to further the needs of In-
dian tribes, and that such legislation is not viewed as race-based, the
Court highlighted the OHA's status as a state agency employing pub-
lic officials, and disavowed the notion "that Congress may authorize a
State to establish a voting scheme that limits the electorate for its
public officials to a class of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all non-
Indian citizens."56 Justice Kennedy concluded that "[tihe elections for
OHA trustee are elections of the State, not of a separate quasi-
sovereign, and they are elections to which the Fifteenth Amendment
applies."57
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion chastises the majority for "de-
cid[ing] this case on the basis of so vague a concept as 'quasi-
sovereign.' "58 He might have also charged that the majority's analysis
ments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-713, 102 Stat. 4784, and other statutes that benefit Native
Hawaiians invoke an analogy between them and Indian tribes, relying on the federal gov-
ernment's trust relationship toward aboriginal peoples as a justification. For example, when
enacting the HHCA, Congress cited previous enactments granting Indians special privileges
in using public lands. See H.R. REP. No. 66-839, at 11 (1920). The Secretary of the Interior
supported the legislation describing Native Hawaiians as "our wards.., for whom in a sense
we are trustees." Id. at 4.
In Rice, the lower federal courts both found the proffered analogy between Hawaii's na-
tive peoples and Indians probative, although not entirely convincing. The district court con-
cluded that the Native Hawaiians enjoyed a "unique status" derived from trust obligations
owed by Congress and Hawaii toward them, and that the OHA's voting restriction was not
race-based. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1551-55 (D. Haw. 1997). The appellate
court, which viewed the restriction as race-based, found the comparison between Native
Hawaiians and Indian tribes sufficiently powerful to provide the requisite compelling inter-
est needed to save the restriction under the application of strict scrutiny. See Rice v.
Cayetano, 146 F. 3d 1075,1082 (9th Cir. 1998).
53. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1057-59.
54. Justice Breyer argued that even if Native Hawaiians resembled an Indian tribe, the
OHA electorate and its programs extend to Hawaiians more generally, a group that includes
individuals who may be less than one five-hundredth aboriginal Hawaiian. This, he argued,
creates a "vast and unknowable body of potential members... [that] goes well beyond any
reasonable limit." Id. at 1062 (Breyer, J., concurring). Acknowledging that tribes have con-
siderable discretion to define their membership, he emphasized that the OHA's classifica-
tion was drawn by the State, not a federally recognized tribe. See id. But see id. at 1066 n.l
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1058.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1059.
58. Id. at 1061.
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seems doctrinally confused. Insofar as aboriginal Hawaiians may fairly
be analogized to Indian tribes, they should be viewed as a distinct po-
litical or legal group, as opposed to a racial one. This difference un-
derlies the deferential review applied in cases like Mancari and is the
reason Hawaii invoked the tribal comparison in the first instance. The
Court's conclusion that the OHA's voting restriction violates the Fif-
teenth Amendment, however, necessarily rests on the view that Ha-
waii has restricted the OHA's electorate based on race. Thus, on this
reading, Rice is simply incoherent. Either Hawaii's indigenous people
enjoy a distinct political or legal status akin to that accorded to an In-
dian tribe, or they constitute a racial group such that the strictures of
the Fifteenth Amendment apply to the OHA's voting regime. The
Court in Rice, however, seems to be adhering to both propositions.
The Court certainly viewed the OHA's voting regime as bestowing
a benefit distinct from the types of benefits provided to tribal mem-
bers under a host of other federal programs, including the job prefer-
ences at issue in Mancari. Justice Kennedy explained that extending
Mancari to approve the OHA's electoral regime would allow Hawaii
"to fence out whole classes of its citizens from decisionmaking in criti-
cal state affairs."59 Indeed, the Court appears to have understood the
OHA's voting regime to implicate a fundamental constitutional right,
namely the right to vote, while it saw Mancari as involving no corre-
spondingly fundamental right to the benefits at issue there. As a result,
the Court could simply have concluded under the Fourteenth
Amendment that, Mancari notwithstanding, it must apply strict judi-
cial scrutiny to the State of Hawaii's attempt to deny non-native Ha-
waiians the fundamental right to vote, and further that the restriction
failed under such analysis.'
The Rice Court, however, proceeded to hold that the OHA's re-
striction violates the Fifteenth, not the Fourteenth, Amendment,
which necessarily implies that the restriction not only denies the right
to vote, but also does so based on race. Justice Kennedy wrote that the
voting restriction, "is neither subtle nor indirect" and specifically
"grant[s] the vote to persons of defined ancestry and to no others."6
Noting that "[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race,"'62 Justice Kennedy
concluded that Hawaii, in enacting the voting restriction, "has used
59. Id. at 1059.
60. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (applying strict
scrutiny to a classification affecting the fundamental right to vote); see also City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of Politi-
cal Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2000).
61. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1055.
62. Id.
[Vol. 99:491
Race and the Right to Vote
ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose"" - an act that
"implicates the same grave concerns as a classification specifying a
particular race by name."' The restriction, in short, constitutes a for-
bidden "race-based voting qualification."65
Rice thus oddly accepts the Indian analogy but nevertheless insists
that the OHA's electoral restriction rests on a racial classification. It
holds that aboriginal Hawaiians may well enjoy a special legal or po-
litical status when receiving employment preferences or other benefits,
such that Harold Rice and others cannot complain of a denial of these
benefits based on race. But once Hawaii's native people compose an
exclusive electorate for a state agency like the OHA, they are trans-
formed (at least for purposes of judicial review) into a racial group
such that Mr. Rice's exclusion from the OHA's electorate now violates
the Fifteenth Amendment.
The decision accordingly conceives of race not as an immutable
physical characteristic,66 but instead as a legal conclusion reached
when the State organizes a group for some activities, but not others.67
The distribution of employment benefits does not suffice to render a
group racial, but the definition of a state agency's constituency does.
Rice appears to be based on the idea that race is contingent on politi-
cal and social circumstances. While many scholars conceive of race as
a position within a broad social network,68 Rice implies that the con-
63. Id. at 1056.
64. Id. at 1057. The concurring justices agreed. See id. at 1062 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(describing OHA electoral restriction as "a race-based voting definition"). But see id. at
1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The ability to trace one's ancestry to a particular progeni-
tor at a single distant point in time may convey no information about one's own apparent or
acknowledged race today. Neither does it of necessity imply one's own identification with a
particular race, or the exclusion of any others 'on account of race.' ").
65. Id. at 1057.
66. See, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE 43-73 (1992); F.
JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? 1-16 (1991); JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER
FEAGEN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 6-9 (5th ed. 1996); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994); see also Ariela J.
Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South,
108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998).
67. In this sense, Rice comports with the view that law shapes the process of racial con-
struction. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Ian F. Haney-L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Obser-
vations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); Christine B. Hickman, The
Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Por-
traits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995).
68. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 66, at 54 ("Race is a concept which signifies and
symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.");
Sally Haslanger, Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?, 34
NOUS 31, 44 (2000) (noting that a race is a group "demarcated by the geographical associa-
tions accompanying perceived body type, when those associations take on evaluative signifi-
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cept of race is conjured up only selectively and depends on the pur-
pose for which the group has been aggregated. Geographic origin,
common ancestry, and social status play a role, but it is the activity in
which the group is engaged that dictates whether, for the purpose of
legal analysis, it is a racial group.6 9
While Rice thus appears to subscribe to the idea that race is a mal-
leable concept, it does not explain why the OHA's electoral process
gives rise to a finding of race-based decisionmaking. Put differently, it
fails to explain why the OHA's electoral process transforms a nonsus-
pect classification into a prohibited racial one.
B. Race as Transformative: The OHA as a Special-Purpose District
The Supreme Court has held that jurisdictions may limit the elec-
torate for so-called "special-purpose" districts to those deemed most
affected by district governance. It has reasoned that such districts do
not exercise general governmental powers and thus, their restrictive
voting regimes should be understood to implicate neither the funda-
mental right to vote nor the one-person, one-vote requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, accordingly, does not subject
such restrictions to strict judicial scrutiny and instead reviews them
most deferentially.7" For example, in Salyer Land Company v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District,7 the Court upheld a California law
cance concerning how members of the group should be viewed and treated... [Race] is not
an absolute fact, but will depend on context"); see also DON HERZOG, POISONING THE
MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 283-99 (1998) (discussing different conceptions of race);
JACQUELINE STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE STATE (1999); Christopher A. Ford, Adminis-
tering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231
(1994); Haney-L6pez, supra note 67, at 1-5.
69. Cf. Gross, supra note 66, at 112-13, 163-64 (noting how litigants in the antebellum
South could prove "whiteness" by reporting having engaged in acts of citizenship such as
voting).
70. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); see also Associated Enter. v. Toltec Watershed
Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970)
(noting "that there might be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose
duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately
affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds [v. Sims] might
not be required"); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1968).
For academic critiques of the Court's approach to special-purpose districts, see SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 66-67 (1998); Richard Briffault, Who
Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339
(1993); William A. Garton, One Person, One Vote in Special District Elections: Two Ideas
and an Illustration, 20 S.D. L. REV. 245 (1975); David L. Martin, "One Person, One Vote"
and California's Water Districts, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 9 (1973); Frank Michel-
man, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41
FLA. L. REV. 443, 465-69 (1989); William H. Riker, Democracy and Representation: A Rec-
onciliation of Ball v. James and Reynolds v. Sims, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (1982); Glenn
P. Smith, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, One-Vote: Better Results from the Voting
Rights Act?, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1153 (1996).
71. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
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allowing only landowners to vote for the board of directors for a water
storage district, and apportioning votes according to the value of land
owned. Because the water district had "relatively limited authority,
7 2
providing only for water storage and distribution as opposed to the
general public services ordinarily financed by a municipal body, and
because its actions "disproportionately affect[ed] landowners,"73 the
State could "rationally conclude that [resident and nonresident land-
owners], to the exclusion of residents, should be charged with respon-
sibility for [district] operation."74
Likewise, in Ball v. James,75 the Court upheld an Arizona law that
limited the electorate for the directors of the Salt River Project Agri-
cultural Improvement and Power District to landowners and appor-
tioned voting power based on the number of acres owned. While ac-
knowledging that the district exercised more extensive powers over a
greater portion of the State's population than did the special district at
issue in Salyer,76 the Court concluded that the district's authority fell
short of providing the "normal functions of government."77 Charac-
terizing the relationship between nonvoting residents and the district
as "essentially that between consumers and a business enterprise from
which they buy,"7" the Court concluded that the State could rationally
limit the vote to landowners and apportion it depending on acreage
owned, "since that number reasonably reflects the relative risks they
incurred as landowners and the distribution of the benefits and the
burdens of the District's water operations."79
The claim that nonvoting residents lacked a substantial interest in
district policy was highly questionable in Salyer given the district's
authority over flood control measures, s" and it was simply implausible
72. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728.
73. Id. at 729.
74. Id. at 731.
75. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
76. Ball, 451 U.S. at 365 (noting that the Salt River District includes half the population
of the State, has statutory power to generate and sell electric power, and delivers water for
both agricultural and nonagricultural purposes).
77. Id. at 366 (emphasizing that the district "cannot impose ad valorem property taxes
or sales taxes[,] ... cannot enact laws governing the conduct of citizens, nor... administer
such normal functions of government as the maintenance of streets, the operation of schools,
or sanitation, health, or welfare services").
78. Id. at 370.
79. Id. at 371.
80. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 737-38
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Stor-
age Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144, 150 (E.D. Cal. 1972) (Browning, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (noting interest of lessees in water district policies); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1668 (2d ed. 1988); Briffault, supra note 70, at 361-62,
370; Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt. Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of
Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1982); James A.
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in Ball, where the record demonstrated that landowner voting led to a
steep rise in electric costs for nonvoting residents.8 Indeed, the direct
financial stake such residents had in the policies of the Salt River Dis-
trict makes Ball seem indistinguishable from bond cases such as
Cipriano v. City of Houma,2 where the Court held that all ratepayers,
not just property holders, had a fundamental right to vote on city bond
issues, given that municipal policy affected them as well.83 So too, Ball
seems to be at odds with Kramer v. Union Free School District,84 where
the Court held that the exclusion from school board elections of a
childless resident who neither rented nor owned property in the dis-
trict ignored his substantial interest in district affairs and thus denied
him his fundamental right to vote."
Nevertheless, the Court has not questioned the validity of the spe-
cial-purpose doctrine, and it constituted one basis upon which Hawaii
sought to defend the OHA's voting regime against both Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment challenges. The OHA resembles a special-
purpose district in that it has no authority to tax, enact laws, or control
the provision of basic services to the general public; its mandate limits
it to promoting programs that benefit "Hawaiians."86 Still, with regard
to its designated beneficiaries, the OHA has considerable authority.
Functioning state-wide, it administers a broad range of programs in-
cluding educational scholarships, business loans, housing assistance,
and various cultural activities.87 Its mandate seems to defy characteri-
zation of the agency as "essentially [a] business enterprise."88 Addi-
tionally, the OHA receives funding not just from trust lands, but also
from general appropriations, such that all taxpayers arguably have a
particularized interest in OHA affairs.89 The district court in Rice,
however, held that these latter characteristics were insufficient to dis-
tinguish the OHA from the districts in Salyer and Ball,9 ° and the ap-
Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Re-
consideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 916 (1997).
81. Ball, 451 U.S. at 384 (White, J., dissenting); Briffault, supra note 70, at 367-68; see
also JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 183-208 (1991).
82. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
83. Id. at 705; cf. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); ISSACHAROFF, supra
note 70, at 67.
84. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
85. Id. at 632; see also ISSACHAROFF, supra note 70, at 66-67.
86. See Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1998) (equating OHA elections
to the elections for the special-purpose districts at issue in Salyer and Ball).
87. See 1998 OHA FISCAL ANN. REP. 38, available at http://planet-hawaii.com/oha.
88. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981).
89. Cf. Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 705.
90. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1558 (D. Haw. 1997) (finding that the OHA
court was "constrained by its overall purpose to work for the betterment of Hawaiians," and
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pellate court similarly found the analogy compelling, albeit not dis-
positive.91
The Supreme Court in Rice chose not to resolve this issue. While
questioning whether Salyer and Ball applied to "statewide elections
for an agency with the powers and responsibilities of OHA," the
Court indicated that it "would not find those cases dispositive in any
event. '92 The Court was emphatic that the exemption of special-
purpose districts from the Fourteenth Amendment's one person, one
vote requirement does not excuse compliance with the Fifteenth
Amendment, which "has independent meaning and force."93 In other
words, even if the powers of the OHA could fairly qualify it as a spe-
cial-purpose district, the Court must still independently scrutinize its
electoral rules to determine whether they deny or abridge the right to
vote on account of race.
To be sure, insofar as OHA's electoral restriction comprises a ra-
cial classification, Rice looks starkly different from both Salyer and
Ball. Whatever the merits of limiting the electorate in a special-
purpose district to property owners,94 a similar restriction permitting
only one racial group to participate raises wholly distinct questions -
questions that are particularly acute for a Court that views all racial
classifications as suspect, regardless of whether they are enacted for
invidious or ostensibly benign purposes.95 That the Court would view
the nature of the OHA's electorate as the basis for distinguishing Rice
from Salyer and Ball is thus unsurprising.96
exercised sufficiently limited powers to qualify as a special-purpose district, such that the
challenged electoral restriction need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose).
91. Rice, 146 F.3d at 1081 (noting that the election for OHA trustees was not "a general
election for government officials performing government functions of the sort that has pre-
viously triggered Fifteenth Amendment analysis").
92. Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1059 (2000).
93. Id. at 1060.
94. For criticisms of the special-purpose district doctrine, see Briffault, supra note 70, at
370-84 (describing the criteria for defining special-purpose districts as analytically unsound);
Michelman, supra note 70, at 465-69; Riker, supra note 70, at 39; Smith, supra note 70, at
1160.
95. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[G]overnment-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is
just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice."); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial set-
tings, [racial classifications] may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics of racial hostility.").
Salyer, Ball, and Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978), did not in-
volve allegations of intentional racial discrimination and thus to the extent the voting restric-
tions at issue had a racially disparate impact, they would not trigger strict scrutiny under the
Constitution. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
96. Cf. Rice, 146 F.3d at 1081 ("[Tlhe voter qualification at issue here - albeit clearly
racial on its face - does not.., deny non-Hawaiians the right to vote in any meaningful
sense."); see also Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106 (1989) (rejecting a broad interpretation
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What is curious is the Court's suggestion that the OHA might con-
stitute a special-purpose district, while also insisting that the Fifteenth
Amendment provides the doctrinal basis for analyzing the OHA's
electoral restriction. The Court has applied deferential rational basis
review to electoral restrictions in special-purpose districts in past cases
only because it has not viewed such restrictions to implicate a funda-
mental right to vote. If district residents indeed had such a fundamen-
tal right to participate in special-purpose elections, the Court would
have insisted on the application of strict scrutiny.97 Rice, then, para-
doxically holds both that the OHA might properly be characterized as
a special-purpose district and that it implicates the fundamental right
to vote.
Of course, the Court's conclusion that the OHA's voting regime
embraces an express racial classification alone would have been suffi-
cient to trigger heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Indeed, the appellate court applied heightened scrutiny because
it concluded that Hawaii had used a suspect racial classification, not
because it deemed the OHA regime to implicate the fundamental
right to vote.9" The Court, however, insisted that the OHA's voting re-
striction ran afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment, and thus necessarily
held that the restriction involved not only a racial classification, but
also the fundamental constitutional right to vote.99
Why then did the Court simultaneously accept that the OHA
might qualify as a special-purpose district and yet ground its analysis
in the Fifteenth rather than Fourteenth Amendment? One possible
explanation stems from the posture of the case itself. Whether the
OHA itself may constitutionally disburse benefits only to Hawaiians
and Native Hawaiians is a disputed question,1°° but not one that was
of Salyer because it "would render the Equal Protection Clause inapplicable even to a re-
quirement that all members of the [limited government] board be white males").
97. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 746 (1982); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
98. See Rice, 146 F.3d at 1081 (arguing that the OHA electoral restriction "does not
deny non-Hawaiians the right to vote in any meaningful sense"); see also id. at 1082 (empha-
sizing the special trust relationship between Hawaii and its indigenous people, and finding
that the voting restriction "ultimately responds to the state's compelling responsibility to
honor the trust, and.., is precisely tailored to the perceived value that a board 'chosen from
among those who are interested parties would be the best way to insure proper management
and adherence to the needed fiduciary principles' ").
99. Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1030 (2000).
100. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relation-
ship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudica-
tion and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1754, 1756-67 (1997); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian
People, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95 (1998).
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before the Court in Rice. The Court reviewed only the validity of
OHA's electoral restriction, and, consequently, it "assume[d] the va-
lidity of the underlying administrative structure and trusts, without in-
timating any opinion on that point."' 1 That assumption, of course,
made analysis of the voting restriction under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment more complex given that the application of strict scrutiny would
require the Court to assess whether the State had narrowly tailored
the restriction to a compelling interest while assuming the constitu-
tionality of the OHA itself.1 2
The task, however, would have been far from insurmountable. An
assumption that the OHA is constitutional would not have required
the Court to conclude that the OHA's mission constitutes a compel-
ling interest. 3 Even if such a conclusion had necessarily followed or
was otherwise reached, the Court's rejection of Mancari's application
to the OHA's voting restriction suggests that it would have struck
down the voting restriction on the question of fit. The OHA might
well represent a legitimate state office, and indeed, one serving com-
pelling state interests, but Rice itself suggests that the Court would not
have viewed the OHA's voting restriction as narrowly tailored to the
agency's mandate."°
In light of these difficulties, the Court simply might have viewed
the Fifteenth Amendment as a cleaner basis upon which to decide the
case.' But if the Court was looking for simplicity, its refusal to dis-
101. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1059.
102. Such complexity is not novel. Compare Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (as-
suming that compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), is a
compelling state interest); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (same); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995) (same), with Bush, 517 U.S. at 992 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that section 2 should be assumed to be constitutional "unless and until current lower
court precedent is reversed and it is held unconstitutional"); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (questioning the constitutionality of section 2). Of
course, the morass that is the Voting Rights Act in the wake of the Shaw decisions may well
have given the Court pause in pursuing a similar analytical path in Rice. See Richard H.
Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505
(1997).
103. As noted above, insofar as Hawaii's native people are fairly characterized as Indi-
ans, the Court would regard them as a political, as opposed to racial, group and accordingly
would evaluate the OHA's electoral regime under rational basis review. See supra Part II.A.
104. See Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1058 ("It does not follow from Mancari, however, that Con-
gress may authorize a State to establish a voting scheme that limits the electorate for its
public officials to a class of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all non-Indian citizens."); id. at
1061 (asserting that all citizens have an interest in OHA affairs).
105. At oral argument, petitioner's counsel argued in favor of reliance on what he
viewed as the greater simplicity of a decision based on the Fifteenth rather than the Four-
teenth Amendment. In so arguing, however, he was referring to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's one person, one vote principle, and not its application to race-based classifications.
While insisting that the restriction violated the one person, one vote principle, counsel
stated, "I think it is much easier to say that [the voting restriction] denies the right to vote on
account of race. This a racial determination, and the right to vote is being denied here." Ar-
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qualify the OHA as a special-purpose district seems difficult to ex-
plain. Of course, the Court may genuinely have thought the OHA
could constitute such a district, or it may have been concerned that
any effort to distinguish the OHA from special-purpose districts would
necessarily call prior decisions including Ball v. James into question.
Rice's concurrent refusal to disavow the special-purpose label for
the OHA and its finding of a Fifteenth Amendment violation may,
however, be better understood as an illustration of the transformative
power of racial classifications. Rice holds that, while a special-purpose
district that restricts the electorate to property owners does not impli-
cate the fundamental right to vote, a similarly empowered district that
classifies voters by race does implicate this right. The property owners
who selected the board of directors for the Salt River District at issue
in Ball were engaged in an administrative act, and thus those excluded
from participation found their claims of entitlement subject to the
most minimal judicial review. Hawaii's exclusion of Mr. Rice from
participation in OHA elections violated the Constitution not because
the OHA exercised powers distinct from those held by Salt River Dis-
trict, but because the use of a race-based classification transformed an
administrative electoral system into a highly significant one implicat-
ing the fundamental right to vote. Under Rice, then, the constitutional
right to vote hinges on definition of the electorate, not on the purpose
of the election. As with its treatment of the Indian analogy, the Rice
majority does not explain why the use of race causes this transforma-
tion in the agency's selection process.
C. Race as Infectious: The OHA Electorate as Property Holders
Related to its reliance on the special-purpose district precedent,
the State also maintained that the OHA's voting regime passed consti-
tutional muster because members of the agency's electorate shared a
common property interest as the beneficiaries of OHA-administered
trusts. The restriction, the State insisted, merely limited the franchise
to the beneficiaries of the OHA's programs "on entirely race-neutral
terms," 1" and comported with established principles of trust law,
which rest on the view that "people to whom assets belong should
have control over them.""1 7 The State reasoned that "a board of trus-
tees chosen from among those who are interested parties would be the
best way to insure proper management and adherence to the needed
gument for Petitioner at 4, United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Rice (No. 98-
818).
106. Brief for Respondent at 18, Rice (No. 98-818).
107. STANDING COMM. REP. No. 59 (1978), reprinted in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 644 (1980).
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fiduciary principles.""1 8 The beneficiaries of OHA programs "would
best protect their own rights,"1 °9 while allowing others, who were not
trust beneficiaries, to vote might create a conflict of interest for the
trustees.11°
The Court cursorily rejected this argument. It first questioned
whether the restriction was "symmetric with the beneficiaries of the
programs OHA administers," citing the fact that some benefits go only
to Native Hawaiians even though all Hawaiians may vote in OHA
elections."' Regardless, the Court stated, the restriction failed "on
more essential grounds," namely that "[t]here is no room under the
[Fifteenth] Amendment for the concept that the right to vote in a par-
ticular election can be allocated based on race. Race cannot qualify
some and disqualify others from full participation in our democ-
racy.
u11 2
Property ownership, of course, does not provide a legitimate basis
upon which to restrict the electorate for general purpose elections,"3
and while the Court was willing to entertain the suggestion that the
OHA was a special-purpose district for which property-based electoral
restrictions are permissible,"4 its conclusion that Hawaii defined the
OHA's electorate in racial terms left it unmoved by this seemingly dis-
tinct, legitimate factor that also explained the restriction. Put differ-
ently, the Court's quick dismissal of Hawaii's property-based defense
suggests that it viewed the State's use of race in this context as cor-
rupting an otherwise valid basis for state action. Even if a shared
property interest existed among members of the OHA electorate, the
Court could not ignore what it saw as the vitiating effect of the racial
classification. In contrast to its approach to so-called mixed motive
108. Id.
109. Id. at 645.
110. Brief for Respondent at 18, Rice (No. 98-818).
111. Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1060 (2000).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (invalidating
state poll tax under Fourteenth Amendment because a State violates the Equal Protection
Clause "whenever it makes affluence of a voter.., an electoral standard"). From the colo-
nial period through much of the nineteenth century, property ownership, race and sex were
the defining characteristics of the electorate in most jurisdictions in the United States. See,
e.g., CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY,
1760-1860 (1960); Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic,
41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989). Ownership of land or other significant assets was deemed a
prerequisite to voting because it was thought to ensure the independent thought and free
will of the franchise holder. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 269 (1991); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitu-
tional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1328-29 (1987); Steinfeld, supra.
114. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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cases under the Fourteenth Amendment,"5 the Court in Rice held
that, on the facts before it, the State's reliance on race ends the inquiry
under the Fifteenth Amendment, regardless of the nature of otherwise
legitimate factors that might also explain the State's action. Why the
Court adopted such an absolutist view of franchise restrictions is, once
again, left unexplained.
III. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF VOTING AND THE IMPACT OF RACE
The complex path by which the Court reached its holding in Rice
embodies a distinct conception of the value of political participation,
the nature of racial classification, and the relationship between the
two. This Part first discusses the intrinsic benefits voting offers. It then
argues that the puzzling path the Court followed in Rice reflects a dis-
tinct understanding of voting's intrinsic values and the way in which
racially-defined electoral rules affect those values.
A. Intrinsic Values
Political participation through voting offers a mechanism through
which citizens shape and legitimize public policy and protect them-
selves from governmental action that undermines individual liberty."6
In addition to these instrumental values, the right to vote and its exer-
cise yield two related intrinsic benefits. The first is the expressive
value derived from inclusion in the political community. This reflects
an understanding of the vote as "an affirmation of belonging" that sig-
nals the jurisdiction's acceptance of the voter as a full citizen within
the polity.117 Denial of the vote is tantamount to exclusion from the
115. See, e.g., Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Had the Court
in Rice grounded its analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment, it might well have deemed
the difficult line-drawing process required in mixed-motive cases unnecessary given the ap-
parent identity and causal connection between the race and property-based classifications.
See also infra Part III.B.
116. See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 23-
43 (1977); Michelman, supra note 70, at 451.
117. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION 93 (1989) ("Voting... is an assertion of belonging to a political com-
munity."); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 26
(1991); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
1965-1990, at 15-16 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (noting that the
right to vote "confer[s] full citizenship on the members of the group"); Gardner, supra note
80, at 906 ("To seek the vote is to seek formal recognition as a full member of society; to be
denied the vote is to be either excluded altogether from membership in the community or
consigned to some kind of second-class citizenship."); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Mis-
readings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 237 (1989) (discussing the symbolic value of civic inclusion); Pamela
S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77
VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991) (noting that voting "announces that the voter is a full member of the
political community"); see also HERZOG, supra note 68, at 29-33 (discussing gradations of
citizenship).
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community or relegation to second-class citizenship, with the message
of exclusion being the primary harm produced.1"'
Related to, but ultimately distinct from,"9 the view that an expres-
sive benefit arises from inclusion in the polity lies the belief that a pro-
cess of self-identification occurs as a result of one's participation in the
political process through actual exercise of the franchise. Under this
view, the denial of the vote does more than send a harmful message of
exclusion; it denies the individual the constitutive benefit that active
participation yields. Political engagement of this sort "is valued as a
process of formation or field of exertion of self or community...
[through which] persons or communities (or both, reciprocally) forge
identities, and persons assume freedom in the 'positive' sense of social
and moral agency.""12 By calling on individuals to deliberate on issues
of public importance, voting becomes a vehicle for self-development
and identification, 2' and a means for creating alliances and thus a
community among individuals so engaged.122
For a discussion of the expressive benefit derived from the post-Civil War enfranchise-
ment of African-American men and the expressive harm generated by post-Reconstruction
disenfranchisement, see LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE
AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 531-556 (1979), and GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER
AND JIM CROW 123-24 (1996). For a discussion regarding the expressive benefits associated
with the Nineteenth Amendment, see Reva B. Siegal, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth
Amendment: Reasoning About "the Woman Question" in the Discourse of Sex Discrimina-
tion, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW (Austin, Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).
118. See Gardner, supra note 80, at 906; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000)
(discussing expressive harms); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw
v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (same).
119. While closely related, voting's expressive and constitutive values offer distinct
benefits. But see Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 364 (1993)
(arguing that voting's constitutive value is a component of its expressive value). The expres-
sive value rests on the message the electoral system is understood to disseminate, and ac-
cordingly represents something bestowed on the political community. Cf SHKLAR, supra
note 115, at 3 (voting is not "an aspiration to civic participation as a deeply involving activ-
ity"); Gardner, supra note 80, at 905-06 ("Voting, then, is something to be had rather than
something to be done."). The constitutive benefit, by contrast, is something voters acquire
for themselves through active engagement in the political process. The jurisdiction inevitably
shapes the constitutive process through the electoral rules and structures adopted, but ulti-
mately it is the voters who do the work required in order to derive constitutive benefits. The
constitutive benefit thus may be seen to be more tangible than the expressive value that in-
heres in the vote.
Temporally, the relationship between voting's expressive and constitutive benefits is not
fixed. An electoral system may give rise to an expressive benefit from which the constitutive
benefit follows, or alternatively may create a constitutive process from which the expressive
value derivatively follows. The latter relationship best explains the puzzling doctrinal route
taken by the Court in Rice. See infra Part III.B.
120. Michelman, supra note 70, at 451.
121. See HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 143-96 (1968); HANNAH
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 251-81 (1963); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representa-
tive Government, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS, 205, 303-24 (Gray, ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1991); Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:491
This understanding of voting's intrinsic value sees political partici-
pation as not simply the casting of a ballot, but instead the process by
which individuals constitute themselves as citizens. It requires active
individual engagement with the expectation that people will realize
the constitutive benefit for themselves through the act of participa-
tion.'23 So understood, voting's constitutive value requires a process
akin to that advocated by proponents of so-called "deliberative de-
mocracy," who argue that principled and open-minded debate among
diverse people should be the defining characteristic of a democratic
polity.124 Like deliberative democracy, the constitutive understanding
of the vote envisions active participation among persons of equal dig-
nity and autonomy, but places less emphasis on legitimated outcomes
than on the direct impact participation has on the individual.'
B. Rice, Race, and the Intrinsic Values of the Vote
While Rice alludes to voting as a process designed to achieve des-
ignated outcomes,'26 the decision is best explained by a conception of
Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994);
see also MACPHERSON, supra note 116, at 47-48, 50-52.
122. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 520-24 (J.P. Mayer
ed., 1969); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 133 (1984) ("[S]trong democratic
theory understands the creation of community as one of the chief tasks of political activity in
the participatory mode."); Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Par-
ticipation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 477 (1988) ("By
acting together in the political sphere, a group of apparently disparate individuals may come
to appreciate the strength of their common interests, and those already so connected may
recognize the power that comes from concerted effort." (footnotes omitted)).
123. See MACPHERSON, supra note 116, at 60 (noting that "developmental democracy"
seeks "not to impose a utopia on the people but to have the people reach the goal them-
selves, improving themselves by participating actively in the political process, every instal-
ment [sic] of participation leading to an improvement in their political capacity, as well as
their all-round development, and making them capable of more participation and more self-
development").
124. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 70, at 447-48 (arguing that participation contrib-
utes to a deliberative process, through which competing arguments are developed and rea-
sonable answers to questions of public ordering are produced); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); David M. Estlund, Who's Afraid of Deliberative De-
mocracy? On the Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71
TEXAS L. REV. 1437 (1993); Galston, supra note 121, at 345-50; Amy Gutmann, The Dis-
harmony of Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV, at 126 (John W.
Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
125. See Galston, supra note 121, at 350; Gutmann, supra note 124, at 141; see also
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, supra note 121, at 234-47.
126. See Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1054 (2000) (noting that the Fifteenth
Amendment was meant to guarantee former slaves the vote "lest they be denied the civil
and political capacity to protect their new freedom"); id. at 1057 ("The ancestral inquiry
mandated by the State is forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment for the further reason that
the use of racial classifications is corruptive of the whole legal order democratic elections
seek to preserve.").
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voting's intrinsic values. The Court, in reaching its holding, demon-
strates its view that voting has both expressive and constitutive effects
and that the use of racially-motivated electoral rules undermines those
effects.
The Court communicates its understanding of voting's expressive
effect through its conviction that even ostensibly benign racial classifi-
cations have a destructive effect on both the individuals who are so
classified and those who are left out. Justice Kennedy writes for the
Court:
One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification
[under the Fifteenth Amendment] is that it demeans the dignity and
worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own
merit and essential qualities. An inquiry into ancestral lines is not consis-
tent with respect based on the unique personality each of us possesses, a
respect the Constitution itself secures in its concern for persons and citi-
zens.
127
Akin to the expressive harm underlying the Equal Protection Clause
violation at issue in the Shaw cases,"z the injury conceived of here
rests on the view that the Constitution prohibits a race-based denial of
the vote because that denial disseminates the impermissible message
that race constitutes a relevant criterion upon which to define the po-
litical community.129 This message itself becomes the harm the Fif-
teenth Amendment apparently prohibits, and the harm the Court con-
cludes that Mr. Rice suffered as a result of the OHA's voting regime.
Justice Kennedy thus writes: "The design of the [Fifteenth] Amend-
ment is to reaffirm the equality of races at the most basic level of the
127. Id. at 1057. Justice Kennedy is, of course, overstating the point. While he identifies
within the Constitution the broad notion of equality based on an obligation to engage in per-
sonal identification, cf. Bernard A.O. Williams, The Idea of Equality, in JUsTICE AND
EQUALITY 127 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1971) (discussing the duty of individual identification),
the Court has long recognized that jurisdictions may define their electorates and otherwise
classify individuals according to a variety of criteria that wholly ignore an individual's "own
merit and essential qualities," and his or her "unique personality." See, e.g., Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (residency duration); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (resi-
dency requirement). More precisely, then, Justice Kennedy is identifying race as a prohib-
ited basis upon which to define the political community. This comports with the Court's
approach in prior cases suggesting that the Constitution constrains the criteria upon which a
jurisdiction may define the political community without imposing its own affirmative vision
of that community. See, e.g., Carrington, 380 U.S. at 92; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380
(1963) ("[T]here is no indication in the Constitution that ... occupation affords a permissible
basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the State.").
128. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see also Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000); Anderson & Pildes, supra note 118, at
1503; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 118.
129. Expressive harms are not limited to cases involving race-based classifications; in-
deed, they have been prominent in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Anderson
& Pildes, supra note 118, at 1545-51.
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democratic process, the exercise of the voting franchise."'3 ° The
OHA's voting regime conflicts with that affirmation, the Court rea-
soned, because it "rests, in the end, on the demeaning premise that
citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others to
vote on certain matters."''
And yet, the Court's conviction that Mr. Rice suffered an expres-
sive harm as a result of his exclusion from OHA elections fails to ex-
plain fully the particular path that Court followed in reaching its
holding that the State violated the Fifteenth Amendment. While Rice
understands a race-based electoral system to give rise to an expressive
harm, this harm does not account for why Rice suggests that a shared,
nonsuspect group characteristic, such as that shared by members of an
Indian tribe, evolves into a forbidden racial one when the State relies
on it to structure an electoral system. In other words, the expressive
harm does not explain how the OHA's electorate became racial in the
first instance. So too, Rice suggests that an expressive harm results
when a jurisdiction defines the electorate for a special-purpose district
in racial terms, but, again, that harm does not account for why an elec-
tion in such a district evolves into one involving the constitutionally
protected right to vote, when the State delimits the franchise by race.
That is, the expressive harm does not explain how OHA elections
came to implicate the right to vote and the Fifteenth Amendment. Fi-
nally, while the expressive harm informs the question, it does not fully
account for why Rice declared an otherwise legitimate definition of a
particular electorate to be illegitimate when coincident with race as
the basis for the definition. 32
Voting's constitutive effect provides the missing explanation. In-
deed, Hawaii intended that participation in OHA elections would
promote a constitutive value. The State limited the electorate for
OHA trustees to Hawaiians not solely because they comprise the
130. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1054.
131. Id. at 1060; see also Pildes, supra note 60, at 121 (describing the perspective that the
self-conscious use of race-based districting "expresses a view of political identity inconsistent
with democratic ideals").
While not confronted with the question, the Court's language suggests that, in addition
to Mr. Rice, those included within the OHA's electorate could also have challenged the
voting restriction under the Fifteenth Amendment given the nature of the expressive harm
identified. This is not to say that an expressive harm causes a tangible individuated injury
akin to those traditionally recognized at common law, but rather that the harm caused by the
government's impermissible message regarding its conception of community causes a harm
not confined to members of one race. See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:
Social Meaning, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 756-60
(1998); Note, Expressive Harms and Standing, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1328 (1999) (sug-
gesting that excessive reliance on race in redistricting "belittles members of both races;
rather than sending a message of inferiority to one group, it presents an unacceptable vision
of society").
132. See supra Part II.
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beneficiaries of the OHA trust property,'33 but also for its avowed
purpose to "unite Hawaiians as a people."'34 The restriction was meant
to provide Hawaiians, "a great and proud people, the opportunity and
the means" to determine the conditions for their own "betterment"
and to promote self-determination and self-government among
them.'35 Thus, the State's purpose was not simply to ensure that the
OHA pursued policies beneficial to Hawaiian interests, or to send a
message of privileged inclusion in the polity, but to provide, through a
process of exclusive political participation, a mechanism through
which Hawaiians themselves could forge a united community and
celebrate their heritage.
The State's error, the Court's holding in Rice implies, lay not in its
understanding of the vote as having constitutive value, but in its at-
tempt to use what the Court deemed to be race-based classification as
the mechanism through which voters would realize this value. In other
words, Rice holds that the Constitution itself limits the type of iden-
tity-forming processes one may experience through the exercise of the
franchise. Thus, a jurisdiction's use of race to define an electorate not
only disseminates the constitutionally impermissible message that race
can legitimately define the political community, but, under the consti-
tutive understanding implicit in Rice, it actually undermines the proc-
ess through which an individual develops an identity through voting.
Instead of providing a forum through which the voter voluntarily
forges alliances with others, a jurisdiction that relies on race to define
the polity is seen to shape impermissibly the alliances to be formed by
imposing the State's own notion of what constitutes the relevant
community.'36 The Court thus sees the OHA's electoral rule to effect
an artificial and impermissible replacement of the process of dialogic
self-identification with a ready-made, state-approved, race-based iden-
tity.
This understanding both that the vote has a constitutive effect and
that a racially defined electorate distorts that effect best explains why
the Court selected the path that it did in reaching its holding in Rice.
The expressive harm Rice discusses follows derivatively from the de-
fect Rice identifies in the constitutive process.
133. For a discussion, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
134. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REP. No. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 1018 (1980).
135. Id.
136. Cf MACPHERSON, supra note 116, at 60; Pildes, supra note 60, at 121-22. For a dis-
cussion of how state programs and political parties affect individual and class organization




1. The Indian Analogy
Consider first Rice's suggestion that a nonracial group becomes ra-
cial in the legal sense when it exercises the franchise. The Court's ac-
ceptance of the analogy between the OHA's electorate and an Indian
tribe presumably means that, under Mancari, the Justices would deem
a program providing aboriginal Hawaiians employment preferences or
other benefits not to be race-based, and instead reflective of their spe-
cial political status.137 Insofar as Hawaii chooses to grant specified em-
ployment preferences to the descendants of the inhabitants of the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778, the Court seems willing to accept that the
State would not be disbursing benefits based on a racial classification.
Rice, however, deems Hawaii's decision to grant the very same group
of people the exclusive franchise in OHA elections to rest on a race-
based and therefore forbidden classification.
The malleability of the Court's interpretation of racial classifica-
tion suggests that race, in this context, is best understood as a legal
conclusion that rests not only on the findings of common ancestry and
a shared social status,38 but also on the nature of the activity for which
the State has assembled the group. The State may permissibly bring a
group of people together for one activity, but the State engages in ille-
gitimate race-based decisionmaking when it brings together the very
same group of people for another activity.
139
Voting, viewed as a constitutive rather than administrative act,
adds the crucial element to an association of individuals and allows for
the Court's conclusion that the State has brought these individuals to-
gether on the basis of race. For example, Hawaii maintained that it re-
stricted the vote in OHA elections to people of common ancestry in
order to "unite Hawaiians as a people."'40 Thus, it meant to provide a
means by which Hawaiians could forge a common identity as indi-
viduals and as a community in accordance with this shared ancestry.
The State created the electorate for the specific purpose of setting this
group off from others in society. Put differently, Hawaii sought to pro-
vide this group with a state-sponsored identity, on the basis of which
137. See supra Part II.A. Rice, of course, carefully avoided resolving the question of the
constitutionality of the OHA itself. Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1059 (2000) (noting
that the question was not before the Court). The assumptions the Court was willing to accept
for purposes of this dispute, namely its acceptance of the Indian analogy, in no way binds the
Court to that analogy should Mr. Rice or another litigant now challenge the OHA itself.
138. See supra note 68.
139. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
140. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REP. NO. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 1018 (1980).
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the group would enjoy what the State understood as the constitutive
benefit of the vote.141
To the Court in Rice, this project appeared invidious. Instead of
providing a forum in which members of a pre-existing community
linked by numerous characteristics can participate, forge alliances, and
develop as individuals and citizens, the OHA's voting regime, in Rice's
view, treats the shared trait of common ancestry as the defining crite-
rion for community membership and the basis upon which alliances
and individual identities should be formed. The regime thus under-
stood brings people together who otherwise might not have joined
forces and instructs them to "unite." The result, Rice concludes, ren-
ders OHA voters "racial" for purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment
because it distorts the constitutive value that inheres in the vote. In
other words, the State may not aggregate this group of people for this
purpose.
The expressive harm Rice identifies the OHA regime to create
1 42
follows derivatively from this perceived distortion of the constitutive
process. Under Rice, the use of the vote in OHA elections as a vehicle
for identity creation renders Hawaii's native people "racial" for pur-
poses of the Fifteenth Amendment. The identity of its electorate thus
transformed, the OHA regime is now seen to disseminate the imper-
missible message that race comprises a relevant criterion upon which
to define the political community, thus giving rise to the expressive
harm identified.
Rice's treatment of the Indian analogy reflects the view that the
employment preferences at issues in Mancari gave rise to neither a
constitutive nor expressive harm. Whatever the effect that follows
from awarding members of Indian tribes employment preferences, the
Court does not apparently think it to implicate the same issues of
community and identity as does the OHA's voting regime, and thus
141. The holding in Rice, however, did not turn on Hawaii's specific goal in creating the
OHA's electoral regime. The outcome would no doubt have been the same had the State
acted with the admittedly implausible purpose of fostering cleavages among native Hawai-
ians. Under this hypothetical, the State posits that native Hawaiians would act as a bloc in a
diverse electorate, but disagree among themselves in an exclusive one. The State argues that
it created the OHA's electoral regime precisely to foster such division in the hope that it
would diminish the role race (or what the Court perceives to be race) plays in defining po-
litical identity.
Regardless, however, of whether the Rice Court would applaud the goal of reducing
race-based political identifications (and leaving aside the question whether the State's
imagined argument represents a plausible mechanism for doing so), the Rice Court certainly
would repudiate the method selected, namely the use of what it deems to be an express race-
based classification to define an electorate. Yet, this deep and seeming categorical mistrust
of race-based decisionmaking of any kind, see supra note 12, ignores and indeed exacerbates
the numerous more subtle ways facially race-neutral state policy may shape racially-
informed political identities and distort the constitutive values inhering in the vote. See infra
text accompanying note 180.
142. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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tribal members do not qualify as racial for that purpose. 143 Rice ac-
cordingly suggests that employment, for all its centrality, does not
have the same constitutive effect on the individual that the vote pro-
vides.4 Lacking this effect, moreover, Mancari's employment pro-
gram cannot render its beneficiaries racial and accordingly is not seen
to disseminate an impermissible message regarding racially defined
membership in the polity. As such, no expressive harm is understood
to follow.
145
2. The Special-Purpose District Analogy
Rice indicates that the State's use of a racial classification trans-
formed OHA elections from ones that might otherwise have fallen
under the Court's special-purpose precedent into ones implicating the
fundamental right to vote. 46 One explanation for the deferential re-
view the Court applies to special-purpose districts suggests that these
districts do not provide venues in which citizens can forge political
identities because the districts exercise such circumscribed govern-
mental authority. 147 Rice suggests, however, that when a jurisdiction
143. For a discussion of the way in which American law has implicitly recognized that
one may acquire a racial identity through the exercise of the vote and through other acts of
citizenship such as jury service, see Gross, supra note 66, at 112-13, 163-64.
144. The employment program in Mancari purported to advance constitutive goals in
terms of encouraging self-governance among the beneficiaries. See Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974). Rice, however, suggests that political participation through voting is distinct
in terms of its constitutive benefit, regardless of the intent of those framing benefit pro-
grams. See Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1058 (2000) (noting that Mancari does not ap-
ply to "a voting scheme of this sort"); see also infra text accompanying note 180. This distinc-
tion between voting and employment may well be counterfactual. See Cynthia L. Estlund,
Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2000).
145. Notwithstanding, Rice cannot fairly be read to provide support for affirmative ac-
tion in employment, education, and other benefit programs. To be sure, the Court's treat-
ment of the Indian analogy suggests that Hawaii went wrong by employing a regime focused
on the definitional level of the polity, and that a more circumscribed effort to distribute pub-
lic benefits to its indigenous population might have survived. But see supra text accompany-
ing notes 100-101 (noting the validity of OHA programs was not before the Court). That
suggestion, however, most likely reflects the Court's inability to place Hawaii's native people
neatly into the racial classifications that generally arise on the mainland. The Court's equa-
tion of Hawaii's reliance on ancestry with a racial classification and the expressive harm it
perceives to follow, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, suggests little receptivity on
the part of the Rice majority to programs designed to benefit groups the Court has histori-
cally considered to be racial.
146. See supra Part II.B.
147. Michelman, supra note 70, at 469 ("[T]he Salt River District and its ilk ... might
easily have been perceived as fora non conveniens for the realization of the self-constitutive
values of citizenship .... Perhaps the majority Justices [in Ball] doubted ... that the Salt
River District, given its history and the accompanying understandings about its place in the
lives of the people, defined or constituted [a political community]."); see also Briffault, supra
note 70, at 363-64 ("[T]here was no community to speak of in the Tulare Lake Basin dis-
trict .... [The sparse population established] not an absence of governmental power for the
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employs a racial classification to define the electorate of such a dis-
trict, it elevates the act of participation from an administrative act
subject only to rational basis review to the exercise of a fundamental
right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. Hence, the use
of the racial classification changes the nature of the participatory act.
What previously might have been perceived of as a process ill-suited
to the formation of the "self-constitutive values of citizenship""14 now
becomes a forum self-consciously designed and understood to pro-
mote a very specific type of self and community identity.
A constitutive understanding of the vote thus offers an explanation
for Rice's concurrent acceptance of the special-purpose district anal-
ogy and its identification of a Fifteenth Amendment violation. Even if
the OHA's power and authority are factually indistinguishable from
those exercised by the Salt River District, Hawaii's decision to use a
racial classification to define the OHA electorate transforms a regime
that otherwise would not involve a constitutionally protected right into
one that does. Precisely because the regime was understood to use
race as a mechanism to foster self and group identity, Rice sees it as
undermining the constitutive value of the vote by replacing the proc-
ess of self-identification with a state-imposed identity.
149
3. The Property Analogy
An expressive and constitutive understanding of the vote also aids
in understanding Rice's quick rejection of Hawaii's claim that a com-
mon property interest justified the OHA's voting restriction. While
the Court's willingness to assume that the OHA might constitute a
special-purpose district suggests that the State could constitutionally
impose property-based restrictions on certain voting procedures,150 the
fact that Hawaii had, in the Court's view, defined the electorate in ra-
cial terms meant that the State could no longer rely on that otherwise
legitimate basis for the electoral restriction as a defense. The illegiti-
mate, racial basis for the State's action corrupted the legitimate basis
district's governing board but the lack of a community within the district appropriate for
self-government.").
It is, however, hardly self-evident that constitutive values cannot be derived from par-
ticipation in water district elections, particularly given the critical importance of water in
particular parts of the country. See GARREAU, supra note 81, at 193 (describing water in
Arizona as "the linchpin of the universe" and emphasizing the influence of water districts in
everyday life).
148. See Michelman, supra note 70, at 469.
149. As with the Indian analogy, here too the expressive harm follows derivatively. The
racial classification transforms the special use election into one involving the constitutionally
protected right to vote. This transformation means that the OHA regime now disseminates
the message that race comprises a relevant criterion upon which to define the political com-
munity vote.
150. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
December 20001
Michigan Law Review
for it. As explained above,' the use of a racial classification changed
the selection process for district governance into a constitutive process
that thus is understood to involve the fundamental right to vote and,
derivatively, to disseminate an impermissible message about member-
ship in the polity. Rice's dismissal of Hawaii's property-based justifica-
tion means that the electorate's shared property interest does not alter
the expressive and constitutive elements of the electoral process, even
though that shared interest otherwise would have rendered the selec-
tion process nonconstitutive and devoid of expressive harm.'52
The question thus arises as to why the legitimate factor fails to save
the electoral scheme, particularly since suspect and legitimate grounds
for a contested state action can constitutionally coexist under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Rice may hold that the property interest
shared by members of the OHA electorate fails to remove the case
from the ambit of the Fifteenth Amendment because that interest
functions simply as a proxy for the prohibited racial classification it-
self. All members of the OHA electorate share a property interest in
OHA-administered trusts, and all members share a common ancestry,
which the Court views as a racial classification. Indeed, the electorate
has the property interest because of its common ancestry.54 Insofar as
the Court interprets the Fifteenth Amendment as not distinguishing
an ostensibly benign racial classification from an invidious one,"' it
may have viewed the claim that property explains the OHA's voting
regime, and not race, as just as implausible as the claim that a grandfa-
ther clause enacted in 1910 was also race-neutral.'56
151. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. In the Shaw cases, a similar connection
between race and an ostensibly nonsuspect factor such as a shared socioeconomic status ex-
plains the judicial rejection of the latter as a basis to avoid strict scrutiny.
155. See supra note 12.
156. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see also Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939). Admittedly, the correspondence and causal relationship between property and
race in Rice parallels the correspondence and causal relationship between race and the "po-
litical" status of tribal members in Mancari. Both criteria capture the same people. Yet, the
legitimate nonsuspect factor trumped the illegitimate factor in Mancari but failed to do so in
Rice. Justice Kennedy wrote that "[it does not follow from Mancari... that Congress may
authorize a State to establish a voting scheme that limits the electorate for its public officials
to a class of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all non-Indian citizens." Rice v. Cayetano, 120
S. Ct. 1044, 1058 (2000). Again, the constitutive understanding of the vote helps explain why.
The special political status of Indian tribes suffices to neutralize the corresponding racial na-
ture of the classification in Mancari because the award of employment preferences is not
seen to involve an identity-forming process. Voting, however, is seen as precisely such a pro-
cess. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text. The State's use of a racial classification
in Rice transforms OHA elections into a constitutive process, and a constitutionally infirm
one at that. The shared property interest also explaining the electoral restriction therefore
cannot save the regime, because its design promotes an impressible conception of self and
group identity.
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A broader reading of Rice, however, suggests that since the Fif-
teenth Amendment, in contrast to the Fourteenth Amendment,
wholly forbids the use of race, any reliance on race to define an elec-
torate, or indeed, even the perception that race had been a factor, 57
not only skews outcomes, but also disseminates a bad message about
membership in the polity and thwarts the constitutive process under-
lying the vote. Under this reading, a perceived reliance on race, even
as one factor among many, imposes a state-approved identity on vot-
ers that undermines their ability to constitute themselves freely as citi-
zens through the exercise of the franchise.
Whether the broad or narrow reading best explains the Court's de-
cision in Rice depends on the scope of the "damage" the Court under-
stands the use of race to cause to voting's expressive and constitutive
benefits. The narrow reading says nothing about the ability of a juris-
diction to rely on race as one of many factors to define a political
community so long as no direct causal connection exists between race
and each other factor.158 The broad reading, by contrast, indicates that
when a jurisdiction defines an electorate by relying on race, even as
one factor among many, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.
Dramatically different consequences follow from each reading.
The narrow reading suggests that Rice provides a Fifteenth Amend-
ment complement to the Equal Protection Clause claim identified in
the Shaw cases. An electorate defined predominantly by race not only
gives rise to an expressive harm cognizable under the Fourteenth
Amendment,'59 but may also violate the Fifteenth Amendment by un-
dermining the expressive and constitutive effects underlying the vote
itself."6 While Shaw plaintiffs can cast a ballot, something Mr. Rice
could not do, Rice's understanding that the vote has a constitutive
157. See Pildes, supra note 102, at 2506-09.
158. A more attenuated causal connection may exist between race and other nonsuspect
factors.
159. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996); id. at 1053 (Souter, J., dissenting);
see also Anderson & Pildes, supra note 118, at 1053.
160. The Shaw cases require the application of strict scrutiny when race predominates
over other factors in the drawing of a district, see, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 962; Miller v. John-
son, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995), while the narrow reading of Rice would bar districts where
race is the only factor that defines the electorate. See supra text accompanying note 156. In-
sofar as race may predominate but still not constitute the sole factor in districting, some
Shaw plaintiffs may not be able to bring a claim under Rice, assuming the narrow reading
prevails. While the prospect of such cases offers one explanation for the concurring opinion
in Rice, see infra text accompanying notes 169-173, the close correspondence that often exists
between race and other districting factors suggests that such cases will rarely arise.
So too, the peculiar standing rules that govern the Shaw cause of action may prevent
some Rice claimants from raising Shaw claims. See United States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737
(1995); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial
Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, Standing & Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2276 (1998);
Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996).
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value indicates that the nominal retention of the ability to mark a
ballot does not preclude a Fifteenth Amendment violation where the
challenged electoral rule is seen to thwart the constitutive process.'
Under this view, conduct giving rise to a Shaw violation will also vio-
late Rice, although the injury identified is partially distinct. Rice ac-
cordingly solidifies Shaw as precedent by elaborating on the nature of
the wrong understood to be caused by an excessive reliance on race in
the design of electoral rules.62
The broad reading, by contrast, suggests that a districting plan that
fails to give rise to strict scrutiny under Shaw may still be invalid under
Rice, and, even more dramatically, that most applications of section 2
of the Voting Rights Act are unconstitutional.'63 As amended in
161. So understood, Rice stands in some tension with dicta in the Court's nearly con-
temporaneous decision Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, in which the Court insisted
that it had "never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment .... [W]e have
never even 'suggested' as much." 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000). Insofar as racial vote dilution
and Shaw-type racial gerrymandering are understood to interfere similarly with the constitu-
tive process, both, after Rice, should violate the Fifteenth as well as Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Bossier Parish's dicta to the contrary should not, however, mandate a different read-
ing of Rice. It falls short of actually holding that the Fifteenth Amendment does not
encompass vote dilution, claiming instead that the Court has not yet so held. See id.; cf.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966). Moreover, the Court's quick dis-
missal of Gomillion's Fifteenth Amendment holding as resting on the "denial of the right to
vote in municipal elections" obscures the decision's broader import. As nonresidents,
Tuskegee's former black voters ostensibly had no right to cast ballots in municipal elections.
See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring); infra text
accompanying note 194. Gomillion nevertheless held that the State violated the Fifteenth
Amendment because it manipulated political boundaries to diminish black voting strength,
which, as Justice Souter notes in his dissent in Bossier Parish, would be called dilution in
contemporary discourse. See Bossier Parish, 528 U.S at 360 n.ll (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969)
("The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute
prohibition on casting a ballot."). Finally, the Bossier Parish Court fails to reconcile its sug-
gestion regarding the Fifteenth Amendment and vote dilution with the Court's prior recog-
nition that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act both mirrors the relevant language in the Fif-
teenth Amendment and proscribes racial vote dilution. See, e.g., Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512
U.S. 997 (1994); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (plurality opinion); see
also Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 360 n.11 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
162. Rice, of course, does not resolve the extent to which a perceived reliance on race in
decisionmaking causes a harm that transcends voting. The question turns on whether vot-
ing's intrinsic values and indeed instrumental purposes may be unique such that, regardless
of the harm race-based decisionmaking is understood to cause elsewhere, it generates a dis-
tinct injury when voting is involved. Compare Estlund, supra note 144, at 3, with Pildes, su-
pra note 60, at 122.
163. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), raises the distinct question whether
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, goes beyond Congress's powers un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things
Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup.
CT. REV. 31, 45; Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights
and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 725-28 (1998); Douglas Laycock,
Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 749-50 (1998).
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1982,16 section 2 sets forth a "results" test that requires jurisdictions
expressly to consider race when designing electoral rules.165 Under sec-
tion 2, an electoral rule "results" in the denial or abridgment of the
right to vote on account of race, inter alia, when members of a par-
ticular racial group "have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect represen-
tatives of their choice. '"'I The Supreme Court, long divided about how
this standard should be implemented,'67 has allowed racially informed
decisionmaking under section 2.168 The strong reading of Rice would
preclude such consideration of race in the districting process.
Whether the narrow or broad reading is governing law is not clear.
To be sure, only the narrow reading can explain the puzzling concur-
ring votes of Justices Breyer and Souter, both of whom have identified
no judicially enforceable constitutional proscription against the type of
racially-informed districting at issue in Shaw and its progeny. 69 Both
justices evidently view the OHA voting regime as different in kind
164. Prior to 1982, section 2 tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 392 (1991) (noting that section 2, as originally enacted,
"was unquestionably coextensive with the coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amend-
ment"). Constructions of the pre-1982 statute (and accordingly of the Amendment itself) to
prohibit minority vote dilution are not easily reconciled with the strong reading of Rice dis-
cussed above. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971); see also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. East
Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
165. Section 2(A) prohibits practices that "result[] in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Voting Rights
Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994). Under the broad reading of Rice, section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act is also vulnerable to invalidation. Like section 2, section 5 prohibits changes to
electoral rules that have a racially discriminatory effect, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (noting that
covered jurisdictions must demonstrate that a proposed electoral change "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race..."), and thus, it also requires that affected jurisdictions consider race when crafting
such rules. The Court's construction of section 5's effects test to bar changes that "lead to
retrogression in the positions of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral franchise," Beer v. United States, 424 U.S. 130 (1976), similarly assumes that
statutory compliance requires that jurisdictions engage in race-conscious decisionmaking.
See also Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 478-85. Even if, however, the broad reading in Rice
should prevail, the record of misconduct that gives rise to coverage under section 5 suggests
that the Court may preserve this provision notwithstanding its reliance on race-conscious
decisionmaking. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (upholding congres-
sional power to enact section 5 as legislation enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment).
166. Id. § 1973(b).
167. See, e.g., Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986); see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891, 903-04 (1994) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (rejecting the Court's construction of section 2).
168. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21
(1995); Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1011-12; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
169. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 103 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bush, 517
U.S. at 1045 (Souter, J., dissenting); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 379 (1993).
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from the type of racial gerrymandering at issue in Shaw, but the con-
curring opinion does not explain why. That Shaw plaintiffs retain the
ability to vote in contested districts while Mr. Rice could not vote in
OHA elections cannot have been dispositive since the concurring jus-
tices view the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition as extending be-
yond the formal ability to cast a ballot.17 Justice Souter has written
that the proscription encompasses vote dilution and other "ways in
which participation in the political process can be made unequal."17'
Justice Breyer likewise has written that a jurisdiction violates the Fif-
teenth Amendment when it intentionally dilutes the voting strength of
a racial minority. 72
Instead, the concurring opinion in Rice and Justice Breyer and
Souter's dissents in the Shaw cases find explanation in the effect these
justices understand a disputed racial classification to have on voting's
constitutive process. The concurring justices agree with the Rice ma-
jority that the OHA's electoral regime thwarts the constitutive process
because it defines the electorate solely in terms of race. They disagree,
however, with the Court's majority in Shaw and its progeny that dis-
tricts drawn predominantly based on race undermine voting's constitu-
tive value. The disagreement then concerns when the use of race in
designing an electoral rule becomes excessive. Rice's concurring jus-
tices believe that voting's constitutive value as well as its expressive
benefit can be derived in majority-minority districts, even when race
was the jurisdiction's predominant motive in drawing the district,'73
but reject the OHA's regime and presumably would reject a districting
plan that completely segregates voters by race based on the view that
such electoral rules render voting's intrinsic benefits illusory. Racially-
informed decisionmaking may, accordingly, be necessary to ensure the
meaningful exercise of the franchise, but electoral rules that rely solely
on race thwart the process of self and community identification that
should inhere in the vote.
Rice's concurring justices consequently would recommend the nar-
row reading of the decision discussed above. But while the narrow
170. Cf. Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3 (noting that precedent does not establish the
Fifteenth Amendment's application to vote dilution); see also supra note 160.
171. Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 360 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
172. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 493-95 (1997) (Breyer, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
173. Writing for the Court in Johnson v. DeGrandy, Justice Souter observed that ma-
jority-minority districts should not be used where meaningful cross-racial coalitions are pos-
sible in their absence. 512 U.S. at 1020 ("It bears recalling, however, that for all the virtues of
majority-minority districts as remedial devices, they rely on a quintessentially race-conscious
calculus aptly described as the 'politics of second best.' "). Such districts are, however, con-
stitutionally permissible and statutorily required where needed "to ensure equal political
and electoral opportunity." Id.
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reading suffices to support the holding in Rice, and nothing in the de-
cision expressly suggests an intent to call section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act or the Shaw precedents into question, the facts of the case
gave the Court no occasion to do either, and recognition of a distinct
injury resting on an understanding of the Fifteenth Amendment to
preclude any consideration of race leaves Shaw fully intact, although
largely beside the point. Rice's breadth, then, remains in question, and
depending on the reading that prevails, Rice may have a tremendous
impact on legal challenges that are sure to follow the districting plans
adopted in the wake of the 2000 Census.
CONCLUSION
Rice sets forth a distinct conception of race, the right to vote, and
the relationship between the two. The Court's analysis of the Indian
analogy reveals its view that race is a malleable concept: a shared,
nonsuspect group characteristic may transform into a forbidden racial
one when the State relies on it to structure an electoral system. The
Court's treatment of the special-purpose district cases demonstrates its
view that race has transformative power: an activity subject to the
most minimal constitutional scrutiny becomes one involving the con-
stitutionally protect right to vote, and subject to the most rigorous re-
view, when the State uses race to link the members of the group en-
gaged in it. The Court's dismissal of the property interest held by the
OHA electorate shows its view that the use of race is corruptive:
property ownership, an otherwise legitimate ground upon which to re-
strict the electorate for a special-purpose district and thus to depart
from the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment becomes illegitimate when it coexists with race as the ba-
sis for the restriction. An implicit conception of voting as a constitu-
tive act with derivatively expressive benefits best explains each com-
ponent of the Court's analysis.174
Like the Court's sentiments regarding a color-blind society,'75
however, this conception may be more aspirational than descriptive.
The cynicism many feel toward the political process"' coupled with
174. An expressive and constitutive understanding of the vote, moreover, helps explain
why replacing an electoral system with an appointive one eliminates the constitutional de-
fect, even though no one gets to vote under the resulting system. See Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); cf Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 (1991).
175. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 67, at 1-5.
176. See generally BERNARD R. BERELSON, VOTING (1954); ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL.,
THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); CiviC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Theda
Skocpol & Morris Fiorina eds., 1999); E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS
(1991); WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT (Joseph Nye et al. eds., 1997).
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the exceptionally low level of voter turnout in the United States 77 may
suggest that, insofar as voting has a constitutive effect, very few people
today derive its benefit.
There is some irony to this fact, especially when considered in the
light of history. During much of the nineteenth century, the electorate
was restricted, but voter turnout was high and elections were events of
considerable pageantry.78 Historian Robert Wiebe explains that dur-
ing this period, "balloting became a form of self-expression, an asser-
tion of one's place alongside innumerable others in the collective act
of self-government."' 79 Latent in Rice may well be nostalgia for this
time and a hope that even without the restrictions characteristic of the
franchise in the nineteenth century, legal recognition of voting's con-
stitutive potential will aid its realization.
If so, Rice promotes a distinct conception of that potential. The de-
cision posits that race thwarts voting's constitutive value by imposing a
state-approved identity on voters. That may be correct, but it is not
indisputably so. Absent the OHA's electoral restrictions, Hawaii's na-
tive people may well be unable to constitute themselves as citizens in
the political process. Vote dilution, even if the result of a race-neutral
electoral rule, might have not only blocked the election of candidates
preferred by Hawaii's native people, but also prevented this popula-
tion from engaging in the process of self-development and community
identification that underlies the constitutive understanding of the
vote.'
Rice, however, squarely rejects this contention. Holding that
Hawaii's reliance on race to foster constitutive benefits violates the
Fifteenth Amendment, the Court seemingly finds no room in constitu-
tional doctrine for the notion that race-conscious electoral rules of this
177. See FRANCIS Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T
VOTE (1988).
178. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol et al., How Americans Became Civic, in CivIc
ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 176; LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL
PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 161-74 (1986); MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF
POPULAR POLITICS: THE AMERICAN NORTH, 1865-1928, at 5-6 (1986); MICHAEL SHUDSON,
THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 5 (1998); ROBERT H. WIEBE,
SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 68, 83 (1995); see also
EDWARD MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 174-208 (1988); WOOD, supra note 113.
179. WIEBE, supra note 178, at 66; see also id. at 82-83 ("Approaching the polls, [voters]
carried a fully panoply of insular loyalties. In the act of voting, however, it was as if citizens
entered a peculiar state of nature, where as they cast their ballots they were stripped of any
identity other than that of sovereign citizens deciding collectively. For that instant, they were
the American People.").
180. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1071-72 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he price
of imposing a principle of colorblindness in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment would
be submerging the votes of those whom the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were
adopted to protect, precisely the problem that necessitated our recognition of vote dilution
as a constitutional violation in the first place.").
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sort may be needed to render voting meaningful. In the process, Rice
glosses over the extent to which race neutral laws may undermine
voting's intrinsic values. In this regard, then, Rice appears to adhere to
the established rule that invidious intent is a prerequisite to a Fif-
teenth Amendment violation.'
And yet, to the extent that an understanding of voting as a consti-
tutive act best explains Rice, the decision may be seen as departing
from this intent-based rule, and instead favoring a more functional ap-
proach that examines the effect a given jurisdictional rule has on vot-
ing's constitutive value. Hawaii, after all, maintained the position
throughout the litigation not only that it acted with good intentions,
but that it did not base the OHA's regime on race.82 The Court found
this claim to be disingenuous,'83 but its holding no doubt would have
been the same had the justices found it persuasive. That is, Rice un-
derstands the OHA's regime to be based on race, regardless of
whether Hawaii so intended, and it is this understanding, as opposed
to any specific motive held by the jurisdiction, that is seen as under-
mining voting's intrinsic values and causing the constitutional viola-
tion."8
All of this, of course, is implicit, and Rice itself offers no express
challenge to the intent-based approach. Even so, latent in Rice may
well be some dissatisfaction with the intent standard as the exclusive
definition of the constitutional proscription embodied in the Fifteenth
Amendment. An understanding of voting as a constitutive act requires
an examination of the manner in which electoral rules affect that act.
Rice accordingly may signal some inclination to move toward the
adoption of a results-based measure of constitutional voting violations,
or, more narrowly, a relaxation of what constitutes intent under the
existing standard.'
Whether such a move would translate into more expansive voting
rights is unclear. Recent decisions circumscribing congressional
authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments em-
phatically state that Congress may not "alter[] the meaning" of consti-
tutional provisions. 86 A return to an effects-based standard for Fif-
181. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1980).
182. See Brief for Respondent at 20-40, Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000) (No.
98-818); Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting this position).
183. See Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1056-57.
184. See Pildes, supra note 102, at 2539-41.
185. See City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 134-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a ju-
risdiction need not take action "because of" the result to act with the requisite intent and
that the common law foreseeability presumption should suffice).
186. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("Congress does not enforce
a constitutional right by changing what the right is."); see also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000) (invalidating a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
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teenth Amendment violations consequently could lead to the judicial
invalidation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act insofar as that stat-
ute's "results" test prohibits conduct the Court deems constitutional
under a restored effects test.
Rice's ramifications, accordingly, may well be far-reaching. Its rec-
ognition that the Constitution protects voting as a constitutive act
gives rise to an inquiry into which electoral rules foster and which frus-
trate voting's constitutive benefit. The Rice Court adopts a particular
understanding as to which rules do what and concludes that this un-
derstanding is constitutionally mandated. The Court thus assumes that
Harold Rice will derive a constitutive benefit from inclusion in OHA
elections. As a corollary, it posits that his participation will enable the
original members of the OHA's electorate properly to constitute
themselves as citizens through engagement in the agency's electoral
process.
This understanding sheds light on Rice's reliance on Gomillion.
From Gomillion's facts, Alabama's racially discriminatory intent
seems self-evident. The Alabama legislature enacted the disputed leg-
islation without debate just after the majority black population of
Tuskegee supported the election of a black woman to the local school
board;'87 the gerrymander removed virtually every African-American
resident from the city limits without displacing a single white voter."8
Less clear, however, is how the gerrymander denied Tuskegee's black
population the right to vote as protected by the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. As Justice Whittaker's concurring opinion points out, "no one
has the right to vote in a political division, or in a local election con-
cerning only an area in which he does not reside."'' 9 Indeed, eighteen
years later in Holt Civic Club v. City of TuscaloosaY the Court ap-
plied the most minimal level of review to an Alabama law denying
citizens living outside municipal boundaries a vote in municipal elec-
tions, even though those excluded from the franchise were subject to
considerable municipal authority. Given the immense discretion juris-
dictions have in drawing political boundaries, and perhaps the absence
of viable judicial standards regarding how better to draw them,' 9' the
case, Justice Rehnquist wrote, must be "stripped of its voting rights at-
ment Act because, inter alia, Congress "has effectively elevated the standard for analyzing
age discrimination to heightened scrutiny").
187. Jesse Guzman lost to a white candidate in a racially polarized vote in which virtu-
ally all eligible white voters participated, while many of the city's black residents had been
unable to register. See TAPER, supra note 2, at 13-14.
188. See id. at 14-15; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 118, at 552.
189. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring).
190. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
191. See Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563 (1989).
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tire,"'" and the Court's "inquiry... limited to the question whether
'any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify' " the extra-
territorial exercise of jurisdiction absent a concurrent extension of the
franchise.193
Despite these difficulties in identifying precisely why the racially-
motivated gerrymander in Gomillion denied the excluded African
Americans the right to vote, Justice Frankfurter overcame his aversion
to the political thicket and identified a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Gomillion's insistence that the Tuskegee gerrymander
implicated the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment parallels
the Court's treatment of the OHA in Rice. In both cases, the Court's
conclusion that a racial classification underlies the challenged laws
transforms an otherwise administrative act into a constitutive process
that thus implicates the constitutionally protected right to vote. To the
Court in Rice, Alabama and Hawaii were engaged in the same en-
deavor, namely delineating a political community along racial lines
and thereby imposing on both those included and excluded a state-
approved political identity. 94 This, the Court holds in both cases, is
precisely what the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits when it bars the
denial of the vote based on race.
192. Holt, 439 U.S. at 70.
193. Id. at 74 (quoting Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dis-
trict, 410 U.S. 719, 732 (1973)); see also Briffault, supra note 70, at 386-89 (discussing Holt);
Karlan, supra note 10, at 289 (noting the different approaches in Gomillion and Holt); Note,
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa: Extraterritorials Denied the Right to Vote, 68 CAL. L.
REV. 126 (1980).
194. In contrast to both Rice and Gomillion, the Court in Holt may well have viewed the
residents of Holt to have chosen voluntarily to live outside Tuscaloosa's city limits and
thereby to have denied themselves membership in the city's political community. See
Michelman, supra note 70, at 478-80. This view, questionable as it may be as a purely de-
scriptive matter, may be the best explanation for the deferential review applied by the Court.
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